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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL
UNREST IN SOUTH AFRICA
by Steve Friedman
The past eighteen months have seen the emergence of labour
organisation as arguably the most important focus of black
mobilisation in South Africa.
While there have been other manifestations of black
discontent - such as school boycotts - labour has moved to
centre stage because it is the area in which black organisa-
tion has appeared to show the most concrete results for its
participants.
Many strikes have resulted in gains for the workers
who took part in them and an increasing number of employers
have reacted to this upsurge in militancy by seeking an
accommodation with the unions.
Worker militancy has prompted important shifts in
employer responses to labour organisation, a development
which has placed stresses on the Government's ability to
control labour events.
There have, of course, been contrary trends - most
importantly detentions of union leaders under security
legislation and government attempts to increase control
over the unions.
Nevertheless, there is a growing belief that a unique
process of change is taking place on the factory floor and
that this in time will have implications for political
change.
This paper will attempt to analyse these developments.
It is traditional, and appropriate in this instance,
to begin with an historical summary of unionism. I assume
that readers of this paper are familiar with this history
and will restrict myself to an overview.
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FIFTY YEARS IN THE WILDERNESS: 1919/1973
It is trite to point out that the present wave of
black unionism is not the first, or even the biggest,
in South African labour history.
The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, the first
mass black union to emerge, had at its height an estimated
membership of a quarter of a million - and then disappeared
as quickly as it had arrived.
The union was certainly a power.in its day - it achieved
several concrete gains for its members and on occasions won
some degree of recognition from the white authorities.
But a combination of state action and bitter internal
dissent led to its crumbling.
The 1927 Native Admxnistration Act, making it an offence
to "incite racial hostility" was largely introduced to curb
ICU leader Clements Kadalie. And in 1924, official atti-
tudes to black unionism were made clear when "pass-bearing
natives" were excluded from the definition of "employee"
in the Industrial Conciliation Act.
There were signs, however, that the ICU was beginning to
decline even before official action and internal squabbles
brought matters to a head.
It has been argued since that the ICU was doomed to
fail. It was always more of a mass movement, a political
rallying point for its members, than it was a union, seeking
to win gains in the factories.
This was to an extent inevitable. There were few factor-
ies in which, gains in the 1920's and blacks had not become
sufficiently established as an urban workforce to wield
significant industrial power.
The ICU was followed in the Thirties by a small growth
in industrial unions for Africans, chiefly organised by white
left-wing unionists, who also attempted to organise unions
on non-racial lines.
The Forties were to see significant growth in black
unionism. 1942 saw both a wave of strike action and the
formation of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU)
which in 1945 claimed a membership of 150 000 in 119 affili-
ated unions.
This was to be followed in the Fifties by the SA
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and, briefly, the Federation
of Free Trade Unions of SA (FOFATUSA), both federations of
industrial unions.
SACTU, too, was to claim a membership of over 100 000
but, as in the past, membership was never stable, rising
and falling sharply within relatively short periods.
Much of the impetus towards the formation of unions
from the early Thirties onwards came from white intellec-
tuals within the non-black, registered, industrial unions.
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Where they could, they organised multiracial unions
(black women were not "pass-bearing natives" and could join
registered unions). This option was later to be closed by
the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, which largely closed
the legal door to multiracial unionism.
Where they could not, they formed black "parallel"
unions- separate black unions with links to their non-black
counterparts.
Through this strategy, black workers were able to win
negotiation rights. They participated indirectly in industry-
wide industrial councils and in official conciliation boards.
Particularly during the war years, when the exodus of
whites to the armed forces meant that African labour was at
a premium, they . won some say in the collective bargain-
ing process.
And their ability to mobilise workers was illustrated
perhaps most starkly by the 1946 miners' strike when
74 000 workers rallied behind the African Mineworkers Union.
But they did not attempt to entrench themselves in the
individual factory. The unions saw themselves as mass
movements, attempting to win as large a membership as possi-
ble in the shortest possible space of time.
Where they sought bargaining rights, these were sought
at a broad industry level, rather than directly in the
factories.
In the Fifties, this approach reached its purest form
as SACTU progressively became a component of the Congress
Alliance (FOFATUSA was to ally itself with the Pan-Africanist
Congress).
It became a part of a mass movement, chiefly employing
its energies on mass campaigns for general demands such as
a national minimum wage.
Both SACTU and FOFATUSA were eventually crushed by
State action. FOFATUSA was banned outright, while SACTU
was decimated by repeated bannings of individual union leaders
From the early Sixties to the early Seventies, black
unionism largly ceased to exist.
Why did successive movements rise to prominence, only
to disappear rapidly?
Official hostility obviously played a major part. The
exclusion of blacks from the official bargaining system
through the 1924 and 1956 Acts underlined the official view
that black unions ought not to exist - that they should be
"bled to death" as the then Minister of Labour, Ben Schoeman,
put it in 1953.
This hostility was backed by an increasing arsenal of
security legislation which restricted union activity and
in individual actions against unionists.
Strikes, such as the 1946 miners strike, were put down
by concerted police action, and the official attitude to
strikes by African workers is illustrated by the Smuts
Government's reaction to the 1942 strike wave.
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It promulgated War Measure 145, which made all strikes
by African workers illegal.
This, in its turn, gave employers far more latitude in
which to resist black unionism.
But the unwillingness of the unions to establish them-
selves in the factories meant that they never developed an
enduring power base.
Unless unions succeed in transforming mass mobilisation
into an enduring organisational base, they remain ever vulnera-
ble to sudden collapse.
The ICU had attempted to organise millions of workers
without the resources to make that organisation last.
Although better organised, later unions were to repeat
the practice of seeking great quantities of organisation,
without concentrating overmuch on its quality.
This is not to suggest that the failure of these organi-
sations was due simply to their getting their tactics wrong.
It is legitimate to ask whether an attempt to securely
establish African workers in the factories would have succee-
ded had it been attempted.
In much of the period under discussion, the bargaining
power of African workers was weak.
They occupied unskilled jobs as a result of legally-
enforced job bars and were thus easy to replace - employers
whose African workforce struck could almost literally go
round to the local labour authorities and order another.
Influx control operated against black bargaining power
and served to keep Africans as an easily replacable workforce
- which could lose not only its right to work if it struck,
but its right to live in the cities.
It is, of course, significant that the one period in
which Africans had appreciable bargaining power - and in which
a shop-floor strategy might have worked - were the war years
in which an acute white manpower shortage increased the need
for African workers, including skilled workers.
This was stopped dead in its tracks in the post-war
years, but the truism that a more skilled black workforce
would pose a much more formidable challenge to employers
and the authorities was to become increasingly apparent three
decades later.
"MAN IS DEAD, BUT HIS SPIRIT LIVES" : THE DURBAN STRIKES AND
THEIR AFTERMATH
The union movement began to re-emerge in the early Nineteen
Seventies.
In Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg, whites sympathetic
to black unionism began to organise worker advice bureaus
which were to become the nucleus of the new union movement.
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But the real fillip to the re-emergence of the unions
was provided by workers themselves.
Denied official bargaining rights by the 1924 and 1956
Acts, black workers at this time were expected to channel
their grievances through plant-level works committees,
which could not achieve a power base even approximating that
of a union.
Strikes were illegal and strikers could facfc police
action.
The result was relative docility in the African work-
force, with the number of workers engaged in strikes during
the Sixties not exceeding 2 000 per year.
But towards the end of 1971, about 13 000 Ovambo contract
workers struck in SWA/Namibia, an event which was followed
by an increase in strikes in South Africa itself during 1972.
The strike wave began in earnest on January 9, 1973,
when 2 000 workers at the Coronation brick works outside
Durban struck in support of wage demands, chanting "Man is
dead, but his spirit still lives."
Their action sparked a wave of strikes in the Durban
area which was to trigger strike action throughout the year.
In 1973, 90 000 black workers were involved in strikes, com-
pared to 9 224 the year before.
The strike wave continued into 1974, most notably at the
textile factories owned by the Frame group.
Unions sprang into being and enrolled awesome numbers
of workers in relatively short periods. In a survey amonq
Durban workers, white students organising the new black unions
ranked in popularity with men like Nelson Mandela.
But this initial wave of organisation was to prove as
ephemeral as its predecessors. The banning of union leaders
- all white intellectuals - began a decline which was to see
paid-up union membership in the Durban area slump to some-
thing in the region of 2000 by the mid-19701s.
In retrospect, it seemed that the brief wave of unionism
in the early Seventies was to be yet another chapter in the
catalogue of the African union movement's failures.
But officialdom and, in particular, employers, lie1, not
seem so sure.
The Durban strikes, which prompted Prime Minister
John Vorster to urge employers to realise that their workers
were "human beings with souls", prompted agonised soul-
seraching which was to go on for years - until, in fact,
the 1976 Soweto unrest switched the focus to agonised soul-
searching about township unrest.
The soul-searching tended to focus on two issues -
wages and "communication" with workers.
On the first, the strikes were to bring in their wake
a sharp increase in black real wages through the mid-1970's
as employers acknowledged that wages of R9 a week were
clearly a recipe for perpetual conflict.
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Nevertheless, the 1973 strikes did mark a watershed
in South African society - and the Wiehahn Commission recom-
mendations which were to come six years later could well
be seen as a delayed "reaction to them.
The strikes were not crushed by state action. There
were few arrests and, while police were ever-present, in the
main they did not intervene directly.
An equally important point is that the reaction to the
strikes was not increased repression, but a halting attempt
at reform.
The reform was hardly far-reaching structural change.
Indeed, the beefing up of committees was an attempt to extend
control through reform.
But the strikes were the first occasion in which the
authorities and employers saw reform - or, indeed, control-
through-reform - as an option, rather than the repression
which had met earlier strikes or waves of organisation.
While repression was to follow - the 1974 bannings were
to be followed in late 1976 by the banning of some 30 people
connected with the union movement - the trend towards control-
through-reform was to be continued.
A 1976 amendment to the 1973 Act granted negotiating
powers to the committees. This was once again an attempt to
thwart unionism, but was the first official acknowledgement
that black workers should be granted bargaining rights of
any sort.
The control-through-reform option was to reappear again
in more dramatic form with the release of the Wiehahn Commis-
sion report in 1979.
FACTORY BY FACTORY: THE UNIONS IN THE SEVENTIES.
Employer and Government moves were not, of course, taking
place in a vacuum.
Official figures indicate that 1973 was followed by a
relatively high strike year in 1974, in which 59 000 workers,
almost all of them Africans, struck.
Although the figures declined sharply thereafter (to
23 000 workers in 1975), a trend which coincided with the
decline of the union movement at the time, they were never
again to drop as low as the figures in the mid-Sixties.
At its lowest point in the mid-Seventies, the strike
figure was more than three times that in the Sixties.
Neither did the union movement disappear after the
bannings of 1974. Although the period from 1974 to 1979
was undoubtedly a lean time for the unions, they continued
to operate and slowly began to grow again.
The Durban unions formed themselves into the Trade
Union Advisory and Co-Ordinating Council (TUACC), which was
eventually to spread into the Transvaal.
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In Johannesburg the Consultative Committee of Black
Trade Unions was formed while in the Cape, a student-
initiated advice bureau became the Western Province General
Workers Union.
TUACC was later to form the nucleus of Fosatu and the Co-
ordinating Committee was later to become Cusa.
There were marked differences between these organisations
But, in varying degrees, they all adopted a strategy which
was to explain in large measure their ability to survive.
The unions eschewed a mass strategy, preferring to
concentrate on building up and consolidating support, fac-
tory by factory.
There were two important elements in this strategy. The
first was a growing emphasis on worker education.
Through weekend seminars, training manuals and the like,
the unions concentrated on training potential worker leaders,
both in the goals of unionism and in the basic skills invol-
ved in running a union.
This in itself was hardly original. What made the edu-
cation strategy important, however, was that the emphasis
lay on building up union skills among grass-roots represen-
tatives in the factories.
They were not trained to become masters in the art of
adressing great public meetings, but in organising at grass-
roots level and in representing their members in negotiations.
This was followed by the importation of the shop steward
system favoured by British unions in which workers elected
by their colleagues in a particular department shoulder much
of the organising - and ultimately negotiating - work in
the factory.
This implied a new emphasis - on grass-roots democracy,
on the building up of unionism from the bottom up. And it
also increasingly implied that unions would consciously
avoid the building up of large "paper" membership which they
did not have the resources to organise thoroughly.
The emphasis moved from the quantity of organisation
to its quality.
The immediate goal of the union movement also changed.
Instead of seeking negotiating rights at industry-wide level,
they sought to win recognition from the individual employer.
If it was achieved, this obviously meant that the union
would have established itself in the factory, would have
won a beechhead from which it could not easily be dislodged.
This was initially a matter of necessity rather than a
conscious choice.
Because unions with African members could not win offi-
cial industry-wide bargaining rights, and did not have the
power to pressure employers into renouncing the official
industry-wide bargaining fora, the only way the unions could
win bargaining rights was if an individual employer decided
to negotiate outside the official system by signing a recog-
nition agreement with a black union.
Political Implications of Industrial Unrest
But grass-roots, factory-level, bargaining, soon became
seen as a desirable strategy in its own right, rather than
as a matter of necessity.
This did not mean that employers rushed to sign such
agreements, however.
Indeed, they strongly resisted any thought of negotia-
ting with a black union. They either told unions who re-
quested such rights that their in-house committees were
working well enough, thank you very much, or cited the fact
that black unions were not permitted to register with the
Government.
One company took a different view. In 1974, the Pinetown
management of British-based multinational Smith and Nephew,
signed a recognition agreement with TUACC's National Union
of Textile Workers - the first recognition agreement with a
black union.
It was later followed by two East Cape companies, Ford
and SKF, who agreed to bargain with the United Auto Workers
- although this bargaining was channeled through the liaison
committee system.
The three companies' decision probably had as much to
do with the desire of multinational companies to answer
anti-investment lobbies in their home countries as it did
with the spectre of worker power. But the agreements did
have an important effect - they illustrated that the recog-
nition strategy could become viable.
This was emphasised in 1978 when Smith and'. Nephew annou-
nced that it would not renew its recognition agreement with
the union but would use instead a multiracial liaison
committee.
The union shop stewards committee resisted and managed
to make a black boycott of the committee stick for over a
year. Management attempts to introduce an alternative to
the union were met with almost total worker resistance,
backed up by appeals for support to British unions.
After the intervention of the parent company, Smith and
Nephew eventually settled.
The dispute highlighted a pattern which was to recur
over and over again and which is still recurring - a combin-
ation of management unwillingness to simply meet worker
demands with repression and growing worker power in the
factories.
Had Smith and Nephew merely decided to ignore worker
demands and rely on firings of worker leaders and the like,
it would probably have succeeded - although obviously not
without great cost.
But had workers not demonstrated growing power and unity,
the company would have experienced no great pressure to
settle and the campaign urging it to do so would almost cer-
tainly have fizzled out.
There were to be many more Smith and Nephews in the next
three years.
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Despite the resistance of employers to recognition, the
union movement continued to grow slowly. By 1977, official
figures claimed, there were 27 unions with African members
representing between 5 5 000 and 70 000 workers.
The existence of this movement, together with fears
about the growing manpower shortage, was to prompt the
Government in 1977 to appoint a commission of enquiry into
labour legislation which was to grant blacks official union
rights for the first time.
THE WHITE MAN'S BLACK UNIONS: PARALLEL UNIONISM IN THE
SEVENTIES.
One other development in the Seventies is worth recor-
ding: the re-emergence of "parallel" unionism.
A "parallel" union is a separate union formed by an
existing non-African union for African workers. Over the
past few years, the term has usually been associated with
unions in which the established non-African union keeps con-
trol of the "parallel" union by installing its general-
secretary as general secretary of the "parallel".
In South Africa, founders of parallel unions argued
that legislation made this step a necessity.
Because the established unions could not take in
African workers, unionists who believed in multiracial union-
ism thus had no option but to form separate African unions
and then ensure that the unions operated, as far as possible,
as one union.
Many of the black unions formed by left-wing unionists
from the thirties onwards were parallel unions.
While their founders were committed to African union-
isation, they were unwilling to forego participation in the
official bargaining system, which they would have had to do
to become non-racial.
Indeed, they argued that by doing so they would lose
important rights which they could use for the benefit of black
workers.
The problem with such an arrangement is that it is
inevitably paternalistic. The African worker representatives
cannot do the bargaining and therefore become dependent on
those who can.
However radical their founders may have been, there are
some who argue that these unions, had they won state recog-
nition, would have become progressively weaker and more
removed from their rank-and-file.
Because they concentrated on industry-wide bargaining,
their very structure militated against the development of
shop-floor worker power, critics argue.
They add that bargaining would have been more likely to
develop along the lines of the system used and known by the
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white union leaders and that the established unionists, with
their superior knowledge of the system, would have continued
to hold disproportionate influence in the affairs of the
union.
We shall never know. What we do know is that the para-
llel unions formed in the Seventies were not usually formed
by unionists with great sympathy for black aspirations and
that they were largely means of controlling black worker
organisation.
The impetus for the formation of parallel unions came
from Tucsa, the Trade Union Council of SA, a hitherto multi-
racial body which had expelled its few black unions in the
late Sixties after the Government had threatened to act
against it if it did not take this step.
In the early Seventies, pressure for Tucsa to readmit
African unions began mounting in the organisation, culmina-
ting in a decision to readmit them and to advise registered
Tucsa unions to organise parallel African unions.
Critics saw in this decision an attempt to control Afri-
can unionisation. As Africans increasingly entered the urban
economy, the established unions were becoming increasingly
unrepresentative of the workforce.
This was not necessarily a problem if African workers
remained unorganised, but a major blow to the influence of
the established unions if African unionisation re-emerged.
Tucsa, critics argued, had shown little interest in
African unionisation during the Sixties when no African
union movement existed, but had reacted to the re-emergence
of this movement outside its control by seeking to itself
control the pace and form of unionisation.
Certainly, most parallel unions wnich were formed were
pretty crude exercises in control.
In almost all cases, the secretaries of the established
union simply installed themselves as head of the African
union.
An investigation by the author into these unions in
1976, published in the Financial Mail, revealed that they made
little effort to enroll workers, relying instead on contacts
with employers who would agree to automatically deduct union
dues on behalf of black workers - often without their consent.
As one black unionist put it : "They organise management,
not workers."
It also revealed that the unions played virtually no
role in negotiating for their members on the shop floor, and
that most of them did not have democratic structures for the
election of officials - general meetings were assigned this
purpose and they happened rarely, if at all. When they did
happen, they were attended by a handful of workers.
Where the African executive of the parallel union took
decisions which threatened the position of their non-African
counterparts, the general-secretary might simply instruct
them to take another decision.
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The general-secretary held the whip-hand because it
was he who did the negotiating, he who arranged the deduc-
tions from employers.
And some workers' feared that the contacts between these
unionists and employers could well lead to the firing of
workers who insisted over-loudly on union democracy.
Asked why she insisted on negotiating on behalf of an
African union despite the fact that employers were prepared
to bargain informally with it, one parallel unionist said:
"They (the Africans) are not ready for it yet".
And another parallel unionist spelled out succinctly
why he ran African unions: "We must protect them," he
said, "from political unions which will start making demands
about things like the pass laws."
Rivalry between these unions and the independent black
or non-racial unions was intense through the Seventies and
many observers saw the Wiehahn proposals as an attempt to
allow parallel unionism legal recognition, and thus to thwart
the growth of an independent black union movement.
NICOLAAS WIEHAHN AND THE END OF CLASSICAL LABOUR IDEOLOGY
THE COMMISSION AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Wiehahn Commission was not the first Government enquiry
into labour legislation. Indeed, it was not even the first
to recommend that black unions be granted official regis-
tration.
Shortly after it came to power in 1948, the National
Party appointed the Botha Commission to examine, among other
issues, the exclusion of African unions from official
bargaining rights.
To the displeasure of the Government, the commission
recommended the official recognition of African unions -
including those with migrant worker membership - arguing am-
ong other points that Africans were becoming permanently
urbanised and that their economic aspirations could not
be met through the rural black homelands.
The commission's report was no worker's charter. It was
critical of the black union movement, recommended a highly
circumscribed right to strike, and in an interesting foretaste
of what was to come, urged employers to make use of a system
of works councils at the individual factory level.
But its recommendations were sufficiently liberal to be
rejected by the Government who instead introduced the 1953
Act establishing the works committees which were designed to
"bleed the unions to death".
The Wiehahn Commission was to have better luck with its
recommendations.
Although African unions have never been illegal, at the
time the commission began its work they had been barred from
official bargaining rights by successive pieces of legislation
13
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Since the 1924 Act, a system of union registration had
been in force. By registering, unions submitted themselves
to official controls.
Chief among these was that they could not have links
with a political party - a term which was broadly defined -
that their records were subject to inspection by officials,
their constitutions had to be approved by the authorities
and a Government registrar could decide which workers they
could represent in the official bargaining system the Act
set up.
By registering, unions gained access to official
bargaining machinery created by law. Chief among these were
industrial councils, which comprised employer association and
union representatives and which negotiated minimum wage and
work condition standards.
Agreements reached at the councils carried the force
of law once they were approved by the Government, which
could reject the agreements but hardly ever did.
And registered unions could bring a recalcitrant
employer to the bargaining table by requesting the authori-
ties to convene a conciliation board, the prelude to a
legal strike.
Registered unions also had much greater power to win
stop order facilities - automatic deduction of union dues,
which are regarded by some as a prime source of financial
stability - from employers.
The legislation also made all strikes which were not
routed through the official disputes-settling machinery
illegal. As only registered unions could make use of this
machinery, only they could call a legal strike.
However, the law laid down that only an 'employee1
could belong to a registered union and Africans were
specifically excluded from the definition of employee in
the law and no union with African members could register.
African workers were expected to exercise their rights
through the factory level committees and could not strike
unless they followed the procedures laid down in the 1973
Act - which were even more circumscribed than those in the
legislation affecting other races.
The only access Africans might have to che official
system was indirectly through parallel unions or by a
system introduced in the late Seventies in which African
liaison committee representatives were permitted to attend
industrial council negotiations as observers.
Shortly after the Wiehahn Commission began sitting,
it became apparent that it was to recommend the registration
of black unions, albeit within a highly controlled system,
as well as the repeal of statutory curbs on the use of
blacks in skilled work.
When its report was released, in a bizarre piece of
symbolism, on Mayday, 19 79, the commission did just that.
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If this was done "at an early stage" , the chances of
these unions being initiated into the system by their regist-
ered counterparts, rather than setting their own barbaining
terms, would be enhanced.
Registration imposed "responsibilities" which could
curb black worker militancy and it was thus best to register
black unions.
The commission's report contained an elaborate blueprint
for a new labour relations system which critics saw as a
formula for control.
It suggested that unregistered unions be denied "stop
order" facilities and be prohibited from negotiating agreements
with employers.
A system of "provisional registration", whereby unions
would be subjected to many of the controls which go with
registration without receiving the benefits, was sug-
gested.
A new industrial court was proposed which many saw as
the body which would supervise the system, as well as offering
protection to whites who feared their job security was threa-
tened by the scrapping of statutory job bars.
A new National Manpower Commission was proposed with
wide powers of "surveillance" over union activities -- one
of the issues it was supposed to "surveill" was the question
of who was elected to union leadership positions.
And the commission also recommended the establishment
of a multiracial works council system — the old liaison
committees, but open to all races — and suggested that the
NMC examine whether councils should have bargaining rights.
In an attempt to allay non-African union fears, it
proposed that unions have equal voting strength on industrial
councils, regardless of their membership, and that no union
be admitted to a council unless all the parties already on it
agreed — both moves which would weight the balance of power
in favour of smaller, non-African, unions.
Many believed that the commission had come up with an
ingenious formula for control-through-reform.
It had opened the way to black unionism, thus answering
one of the key criticisms of Government policy, but had done
so in a manner which ensured that the unions would remain
"tame."
Unions who registered would be effectively controlled,
while those which refused would be "bled to death" by the
restrictions on unregistered unions.
As a foreign observer put it: "They are allowing blacks
to organise without allowing them to do anything with that
organisation."
Some saw it as a manifestation of the Government's total
strategy, in which reform moves were disguised attempts to
extend official control over all areas of society — in this
case over black worker organisation.
That may well have been the commission's intention. it
might even have succeeded if its suggested blueprint had been
introduced immediately (although even that is not certain).
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The industrial court was set up with powers which
would have excited a Spanish Inquisitor — it could pro-
nounce on all matters affecting "unfair labour practices"
which were, according to the law, "any practice which, in
the opinion of the industrial court, is an unfair labour
practice."
Some of these provisions were watered down before the
Bill became law — the R500 fine was dropped, the Minister
was given discretion to decide whether a union could apply
for registration on a non-racial basis and a right of appeal
to the court for unions excluded from the councils was intro
duced.
Nevertheless, although the new dispensation officially
came into effect on October 1, 1979, there were no indica-
tions that any but the "tamest" of unions were considering
entering the official system.
For the Government, the situation was clearly untenable
and, later in October, the Minister of Manpower, Fanie
Botha, issued a proclamation extending registered union
rights to migrants (but not to foreign blacks.)
To some extent, this had the desired effect. Parallel
unions and those in the Consultative Committee decided to
apply for registration (although the latter expressed reser-
vations about the extension of union rights through pro-
clamation rather than law).
Those affiliated to Fosatu (TUACC, in alliance with
a major registered motor union and some ex-Consultative
unions, had formed Fosatu earlier that year) appeared un-
decided, however, and two Cape-based unions, the WPGWU and
the African Food and Canning Workers Union, said they would
refuse to register.
Some weeks after the proclamation, these union groupings
came together for a meeting to discuss registration. While
they agreed on a statement sharply criticising the new law,
they parted ways on the registration issue.
The Cape unions reaffirmed their anti-registration
stance, while Fosatu said it would apply for registration
under certain conditions.
The Fosatu unions would apply, they said, but demand
at the same time that they be granted non-racial registration,
that they not be subjected to provisional registration and
that the registrar not register them in such a way that they
would be forced by law to shed any of their existing member-
ship.
With only one section of the union movement committed
to rejecting registration the proclamation appeared to be
having its desired effect.
That was not to be.
The first indication of a resurgence of the union move-
ment had come earlier in the year when members of the Food
and Canning Workers Union and African Food and Canning
Workers Union at Fattis and Monis' Cape plant were fired
after a strike.
18
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The union announced that the strikers would fight on
for reinstatement and it proceeded to attempt to mobilise
community organisations in a consumer boycott of the company's
products as well as "to raise money for the strikers.
Few believed the strikers' decision to hold out would
mean terribly much.
Because African workers do not usually earn enough to
save and because unions do not have strike funds, the ability
of workers to stay out on strike is sorely limited. This
obviously eroded black bargaining power.
As one employer told the 1973 strikers: "You people
can only strike for a few days. If you could strike for
a month, you would be allright."
When African workers embarked on their only legal strike
-- in Springs in 1976 — they lasted nine weeks. This was
heralded as a major departure, despite the fact that the
strike ended in defeat for the workers who could hold out no
longer.
The Fattis and Monis workers were to last seven months
— and win.
Supported to some extent by money raised for strike
pay — strikers were given R15 a week — they showed unprece-
dented resolution, which at times bordered on the grotesque.
One striker's child died after her father had refused
to collect his accumulated money from the company to pay for
medical treatment. To do so, he said,.would be to concede
that he had been fired.
Eventually, the company, increasingly subject to a commun-
ity boycott and campaign, settled and was later to grant the
unions full recognition.
The first strike after the legislation to give a clear
indication of things to come was that at Ford1s Port Elizabeth
Cortina plant in November.
Workers struck initially over the resignation or dismis-
sal (depending on which side you believe) of a black community
leader, Thozamile Botha.
There were to be several short strikes in rapid succes-
sion until Ford fired the strikers.
This action was not an unqualified success. The fired
men were skilled workers and there was community pressure on
workers not to take fired strikers' jobs. The company's
efforts to recruit new workers — or to rehire fired strikers
— met with little response.
Pressure on Ford from anti-apartheid activists in the US
served to increase the company's desire for a settlement.
In January, 1980, the company negotiated a settlement
with worker leaders.
The strike was the first in which workers downed tools
in support of a community leader, thus providing a fore-
taste of the "community-based" unionism which was- then begin-
ning to emerge.
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The strikers were young, skilled , and better educated
than their colleagues in the neighbouring Ford engine
plant, who did not strike. This was a serious blow to the
view that better educated, more skilled workers were a bul-
wark against worker militancy.
And the strikers once again illustrated the ability
of some groups of black workers to hold out for relatively
long periods — and then win.
Finally, Ford had taken what was seen at the time as a major
step by recognising a Fosatu-affiliated black union. The
union was contrasted by most employers with the tamer variety
organised into parallel unions and the company's step was
seen as dangerously avante garde.
But the strike was to become a catalyst to a break-away
from the union as more militant workers rejected it as "pro-
management". This was to lead to the formation of Macwusa,
one of the new "militant" community-based unions.
This illustrated, as one employer put it, a trend in
which "what seems militant today, will look moderate
tomorrow."
It also illustrated the danger of granting unions a
form of recognition, while channeling this through weak shop-
floor structures like liaison committees, as Ford had done.
The lesson that agreements with unions would have to be
made to "stick" through direct worker participation was to
become vital to many employers.
The Ford strike was to be followed in December and
January by a mini-strike wave in the Western Cape.
While the numbers involved were not that significant,
the strikes were significant from two perspectives.
The issues sparking unrest were becoming more
complex. While dissatisfaction about wages and conditions
were obviously ever-present as a background to the strikes,
several were sparked by demands for union recognition, pro-
tests at the dismissal of union leaders, and the like.
The second departure was that a surprising number of
strikes were being won by workers — at least some of their
demands were being met.
At the Cape Town docks, for example, a stevedores'
strike prompted by an employer refusal to recognise a
union committee, ended rapidly as employers agreed to that
demand — and ultimately to a recognition agreement with
the unregistered WPGWU at three Cape harbours.
By the time employers and civil servants broke for the
end-of-year holidays, they may, had they been reading the
signs, have developed a sneaking suspicion that the total
strategy was not that total after all.
1980: YEAR OF THE RUBICON?
The developments begun in 1979 continued into 1980.
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Strikes affected all major industrial areas, including,
for example, Pretoria which had not experienced unrest for
years. In some cases, they affected rural areas as well.
The Cape strikes continued, culminating in an industry-
wide strike in the meat industry (which ended in a worker
defeat). In Durban, 7 000 Frame Group textile workers struck
for wage increases.
Uitenhage saw a three -week strike for wage demands in
which workers rejected the poverty datum lines devised by
researchers as a wage standard and demanded to negotiate a
"living wage" in excesss of the pdls. The strikes started
at the Volkswagen plant and at their height involved 70% of
the town's workforce.
The Johannesburg municipal strike, the biggest at a
single non-mining employer, the strikes over union recogni-
tion and dismissals in East London, and a wave of wage strikes
in the Rosslyn area, near Pretoria, were only some of the other
strikes to hit industry in 1980.
Some of these strikes ended in defeats for workers —
particularly later in the year after employers had got over
the initial uncertainty of dealing with the strike wave.
But "defeat" and "victory" are relative terms -- particularly
in South Africa where the dice are loaded against strikers and
most strikes have ended quickly in total defeat for workers.
Where strikes were crushed, as in the meat strike, this
was achieved at great cost to employers who had to fire a
skilled workforce and begin training anew. And a surprising
number of strikes ended in a settlement which at the very
least went some way towards, meeting worker demands.
Union membership grew rapidly, and new unions emerged
to win large followings in a relatively short time.
The most oft-quoted example is the SA Allied Workers
Union, whose membership in East London shot from 5 000 to
around 20 000 within a few months.
Whereas the Fosatu and Cusa unions had concentrated on
factory floor issues and had deve&oped largely in the tradi-
tions of Western European unionism, the new unions sought
links with community organisations, proclaimed their commit-
ment to involvement in politics and adopted a "militant"
stance.
They also adopted "populist" methods of mass organising.
In some cases, the "new unionism" was uncannily like
the old unionism of the Forties and Fifties.
The "new unionists" adopted the same mass organising
strategies — with the same results.
Perhaps the starkest example came when 9 000 Johannesburg
municipal workers, most of them unskilled migrants, rallied
round the Black Municipality Workers Union to stage a week-
long strike. The BMWU had only been launched a few weeks
before the strike.
The municipal strike brought the reality of black worker
power home to white Johannesburg and the union's leader,
Joseph Mavi, became a household name in a matter of days.
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Some commentators saw the BMWU as one of the most significant
labour phenomena in years.
But, realising unskilled migrant workers' lack of
bargaining power, the city council and the police crushed the
strike in a matter of days. Mavi and other union executives
were arrested and hundreds of workers fired amd "dumped"
back in their "homelands".
The BMWU's decline was as startling as its rise to pro-
minence. Today it consists of two factions — and, at the
most sympathetic assessment, a couple of hundred members.
But other "new unions", while also organising a relatively
large base, paid attention to building up strength in the
factories. Saawu, for example, is still a power in East Lon-
don, with around 20 000 members, despite repeated firings of
members and police action against its leadership.
The trend towards community participation was not
restricted to these unions.
In Uitenhage, just a few kilometres from Port Elizabeth,
where Fosatu's motor union was being lambasted for eschewing
community links, almost the whole of the union's black hier-
archy were also officials of the Uitenhage Black Civic
Organisation.
And when the Consultative Committee became Cusa in late
1980, its inaugural meeting was addressed by a range of
black community representatives.
Some unions adopted a multitude of increasingly sophis-
ticated strategies for enforcing demands, combining worker
pressure on the employer with appeals to international unions,
community campaigns and legal actions.
The parallel unions steadily eroded. They increasingly
became seen by workers as "benefit society unions" a view empha-
sised by one worker who told Fosatu organisers: "These unions
look after us when we are dead, but not when we are alive" --
a reference to their elaborate death benefit schemes.
In Uitenhage scores of parallel union members resigned
to join independent unions and employer sources were quick to
acknowledge that these unions were ceasing to be a factor
in the area.
Labour unrest, the growing union movement, and their
potential political impact became a major source of concern
to the Government and employers.
What soon became clear was that the tough anti-strike
legislation was being honoured in the breech and that the
control legislation introduced in late 1979 was achieving
few of its aims.
Some of the fastest-growing unions were precisely those
who refused to register; they were often also the unions
whose members were striking.
Besides urging workers to use the official machinery —
urgings which were entirely ignored — the authorities appeared
to be largely overcome with stasis.
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Amendments to the 1979 Act introduced in 1980 limited
themselves largely to changing the definition of an "unfair
labour practice", thus reducing the court's ability to con-
trol events, and in attempting to exclude victimisation
by employers from the court's ambit, thus almost ensuring
that African workers would find no reason at all to pay
much attention to its existence.
Not that the Government was powerless to control.events.
Officials in unrest-hit areas like East London urged
employers to deal with liaison committees; officials are
believed to have encouraged employers to fire illegal strikers;
police were an almost constant presence at strikes; the
Minister urged East London employers not to deal with un-
registered unions and to "hold out" until legislation was
passed to deal with them.
And, at times, police intervened directly — either
by arresting strikers or detaining strike leaders.
But none of this was particularly new. It was the same
Government reaction of the past six decades — but greatly
reduced in its scale.
The Government's reaction certainly did not bear the
stamp of a sophisticated control-through-reform strategy.
If anything, the reform programme reduced the authorities'
options in handling the labour movement.
Because they were committed, at least in the abstract,
to acknowledging blacks' right to freedom of association,
they could not be seen to be taking too tough an anti-union
line — at least by South African standards.
What officialdom did seek to do was to distinguish
between those unions which were acceptable and those which
were not.
But official perceptions of what constituted an accep-
table union were forced to undergo a drastic change as the
year wore on.
At the beginning of the new dispensation, parallel
unions were seen as the acceptable section of the union
movement.They were prepared to register, had been well
schooled in "South Africa's tradition of trade unionism"
and could be expected to make few waves on the factory floor.
But towards the end of the year, a new divide had to
be drawn as it became apparent that parallel unionism was
not a viable means of containing conflict.
Thus officialdom tended increasingly to distinguish
between bodies like Fosatu and Cusa (who, whatever their
commitment to genuine bargaining, were at least prepared
to register) and the unregistered "crazies" (one member of
the National Manpower Commission invited an unregistered
union to address a meeting of business students, saying they
wanted to hear the "lunatic fringe" view).
This is not to say that these organisations were overly
aelighted by at least limited Government approval. Or that
these unions were to be compliant as the authorities hoped.
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But the grand blueprint was undergoing a reformulation
as it collided with events on the factory floor.
The employer reaction was harder to categorise. Many
employers reacted to labour unrest by the time-honoured
method of firing strikers, refusing to recognise unions,
and, at times, by inviting parallel unions into factories
in order to keep their independent rivals out.
Many said they were prepared to deal with black unions,
but only if they were registered.
But this pattern was not uniform. Whatever the Wiehahn
proposals had intended, they created a good deal of confusion
in the minds of employers.
Firstly, because management had been protected for so
long by legislation, South African personell management
techniques were in a state of disrepair and in no state to
respond to the spread of unionism on the factory floor as
some of the bars on unionisation were removed.
If the unions were inexperienced, most managers were
a good deal more so.
Secondly, while many unionists and analysts may have
seen the proposals as a formula for control, many employers
did not.
The press was full of officials and others sympathetic
to the new dispensation talking about the new rights affor-
ded to black unions, and it was often assumed that the
authorities were more committed to freedom of association
than they actually were.
Thus some employers assumed that they would not be able
to rely on official support if they resisted unionism.
These factors were to become less important as events
took their course. Management techniques for handling unions
became more sophisticated and will, of course, continue to
become more so.
The official attitude became more clearly defined —
as in East London, where officials and police made their
opposition to militant unionism apparent.
But the initial inexperience and confusion in employer
responses was certainly a factor in the rebirth of the union
movement.
Towards the end of 1980, however, an employer response
began emerging which was neither confused nor inexperienced.
As the unrest swept the country, a small but influential
group of employers -- as well as a major employer lobby
group , the Federated Chamber of Industries — began ques-
tioning the official attitude to unionism.
Some employers were faced with demands from unregistered
unions for recognition — either from those who refused to
register, or those which had not yet received registration.
The option of choosing a tame union to negotiate with
was increasingly eroding and a refusal to deal with repre-
sentative unions because they were unregistered threatened
to become a source of disruption in the factories.
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At the same time, some senior employer representatives
were becoming increasingly worried at the lack of enthusiasm
from foreign unions and even employers — potential inves-
tors -- for fie new dispensation.
The FCI began to appeal to the Government to make
registration more attractive to unions by eliminating racial
bars, extending official union rights to all blacks and
removing some elements of control from the process.
But they went further — deciding that they could not
wait for officialdom to sort out the registration issue any
longer.
At a meeting in September, the FCI advised members that
it might be advisable in certain circumstances to deal with
unregistered unions.
The biggest industrial conglomerate in the country,
Barlow Rand, also opened the possibility of dealing with
these unions in a later statement.
These initiatives were given added substance later
as the FCI published detailed guidelines, urging employers
to deal with representative unions, whether or not they were
registered, and Barlow Rand made a similar move.
These moves may not have made a startling impact on
most employers — many ignored them. But they did spell
out an alternative to the "no negotiation outside the offi-
cial system" approach of bodies like the Steel and Engin-
eering Industries Federation.
This new approach was also manifested in concrete
factory floor events. An increasing number of companies
began to recognise black unions — including "militant"
unregistered unions.
By the beginning of 1980, there were three recognition
agreements between employers and black or non-racial unions.
At the time of writing there are some four dozen with more
on the way.
This trend does not indicate a wholesale change of
employer attitudes — there are some 40 000 employers co-
vered by the industrial council system alone — but it
did indicate a qualitative change.
For the tirst time, the union movement had begun to
win something which had eluded it since 1919 — a base in
the factories.
THE UNOFFICIAL SYSTEM: PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS
The pattern begun in 1980 continues. Although most strikes
no longer grab the headlines, the strike wave has not abated
and some estimate that there has been at least a strike a
day this year.
The union movement is still growing, despite the fact
that tough employer and police action — firing of strikers
and the like — took its toll on unions, particularly on
the newer ones.
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The trend towards community involvement by unions has
continued, irrespective of whether those unions proclaim
themselves as "community" unions or not — Fosatu does not
have a "community union" image, but developments in its
unions on the East Rand have shown almost precisely the same
trends as those in "militant" East Cape unions.
The small, but growing, trend towards recognition agree-
ments has continued and is beginning to develop in a signi-
ficant direction.
The events of 1980 increasingly revealed the weaknesses
of the official bargaining system.
The industrial councils in particular — cornerstones
of the system — have come under stress and the growing
union movement — registered and unregistered — has increa-
singly rejected them.
At first glance, the argument over the councils appear
to be an abstruse debate about industrial relations structures.
That is misleading. It is, in fact, a debate about the very
basis of union power.
Most employers who are covered by council agreements
insist that it is not their function to negotiate with unions --
that is the task of the professional negotiators in the emplo-
yer association. The individual employer simply abides by
the agreement.
The wage issue is the most obvious example of the impli
cations of such a stance. In most cases, there is a differ-
ence between the going rate — that actually paid — and the
agreement rate, which is merely a minimum standard.
If bargaining is channelled through the councils only,
unions participate only in setting this minimum. The employ-
er unilaterally sets the going rate, and there is no nego-
tiation with unions on actual wage rates.
In addition, black unions argue that the councils have
become time-consuming bureacracies, far removed from the factory
floor, in which unionists are expected to spend their time
helping to administer the bureaucracy, rather than representing
their members on the factory floor.
They thus lose touch with their grass-roots who rarely,
if ever, participate in the bargaining process.
This "worked" when the system served only protected non-
African workers, whose skills were in short supply. If their
members didn't like the going rate, they could sell their
labour to another employer at a higher rate and they saw no
need for collective bargaining.
That option is not open to less skilled African workers.
Hence the demand by unions to negotiate directly at the
factory floor, rather than to discuss wage minima at the
councils. Some unions are refusing to participate in the
councils — others are, at the very least, demanding that
their participation be backed up with direct recognition
agreements.
The recognition agreement, once a goal forced on unions
by legislation, has increasingly come to be seen as an end in
itself.
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Employers in some areas, too, have increasingly been
forced by events to re-evaluate their commitment to the
councils.
On the East Rand, several strikes have been caused
recently by workers rejecting the increase negotiated in
the councils and demanding a higher rate. They didn't
negotiate the increase, and see no reason to be bound by it.
Several East Rand factories bound by industrial council
agreements have, therefore, decided to negotiate directly
with unions on actual wage rates, rather than insist on
applying the council agreement.
At least one company in the area covered by an agreement
has signed a permanent recognition agreement with a union,
providing for annual wage negotiations, and more are expected
to follow suit.
These companies are, of course, a tiny minority. But
it is important to understand the implications of their deci-
sion .
Not only are they agreeing to the development of an
informal bargaining system, free of official control, but they
are also conceding the right of organised workers to nego-
tiate directly on an area of company decision-making.
i'his, many critics argue, is precisely what the official
system — and the councils in particular — are designed to
prevent.
This form of negotiation is thus the most important
breakthrough for the union movement to date — and, perhaps,
the most important step towards free collective bargaining,
rather than the controlled form of unionism favoured by
officialdom and most employers.
It is given added significance by the fact that the FCI
has taken its guidelines a step further by issuing a qualified
endorsement of plant-level bargaining.
The signs at present are that an alternative bargaining
system is beginning to develop. This seems likely to continue
and, if it does, it will provide the starkest example to date
of how Government attempts to control-through-reform have
failed.
Not that the Government has been idle.
Firstly, eleven unionists this year — all from unions
which reject registration -. have been detained under security
legislation. Five are still in detention.
And it has finally enacted into law a Bill which belat-
edly enacts more of the Wiehahn controls.
The Bill imposed new political and other controls on
unregistered unions — a n attempt to subject them to the
same curbs as those applying to registered unions. It also
imposes new controls on strike pay for "illegal" strikers and
introduces the works council system proposed by Wiehahn.
The idea behind the law is to force unregistered unions
to register, thus bringing all unions into the official control
At the same time, it seeks to make the official system
more attractive to unions by extending registered union
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rights to all workers, including black foreigners, and by
removing all references to race from the legislation.
The fact that the authorities have recognised the
growing power of the black and non-racial union movement
sufficiently to make these latter changes, despite substan-
tial white opposition to them, is significant.
Nevertheless, the Government has not yet responded to
calls to refurbish the official bargaining system to reduce
the control it exercises on bargaining or to concede the
principle of direct plant-level bargaining.
The new law therefore seeks to extend control over bar-
gaining and is yet another example of the control-through-
reform strategy. It illustrates the new Government approach
by distinguishing between unions who are prepared to join
the system and those which are not, between those who favour
an overt political stance and those who do not.
Already the doom-sayers are once again gathering to
predict the demise of the union movement as it is strangled
by the new Bill.
However, the signs are that the new law will turn out
to be the same resounding success the 1979 measures were.
Unregistered unions have had two years in which to grow
and they say they will be able to continue operating outside
the system.
And, even if they are forced to register, the view that
registering black unions will in itself control them has been
steadily eroded over the past eighteen months.
There are registered unions whose members are striking
"illegally", which are increasingly co-operating with commun-
ity political organisations and which are demanding to bargain
directly rather than through the councils.
And the Bill's chances of success are further impaired
by the fact that the entire independent union movement has
met to pledge defiance of the clamp on strike pay and to
sharply criticise the registration system and industrial
councils.
Already the Minister is at pains to stress that the strike
curbs and the clamps on unregistered unions will not be applied
"harshly" and that the real aim of the Government is to attract
unions into the official system, not force them to join.
Bearing in mind the history of trade unionism in this
country, that is a major retreat. It seems to say that the
Government itself is beginning to doubt its ability to con-
trol through reform.
WHAT OF THE FUTURE?
I have argued thus far that the signs point to the emergence
of a black trade union movement — this time permanently.
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For the first time, the union movement is winning,
through recognition agreements, a permanent base in the
factories.
For the first time also an appreciable number of employ-
ers are beginning to set free collective bargaining as a
viable option.
At the same time, elaborate Government plans to produce
a controlled, compliant, union movement have failed and its
attempts to maintain control while appearing not to are like-
ly to be eroded even further.
While the union movement has not yet grown to the size
of some of its predecessors — there were about 160 000
workers in independent unions at the end of last year, accor-
ding to most estimates -- the quality of organisation is
vastly different to that in previous years.
The signs are that the movement will continue to grow,
placing new pressure on employers to recognise it and to
seek an accommodation with the unions — a step employers will
increasingly take.
This dynamic has had its effect on the legislative pro-
cess too. Some employers, worried by the increasing gap
between the official system and shop-floor reality, have
been urging the Government to further relax the system to
make it more acceptable to unions who at present refuse to
enter it.
The Government has often reacted to this by seeking
to further extend control — but it has also been forced to
respond, for example, by investigating changes to the regis-
tration process.
All this is not to say that free collective bargaining
is around the corner in South Africa.
The bulk of employers are still resisting unionism —
either directly or by seeking to channel it through councils.
They also often seek to crush unions by firing union leaders
during strikes.
The police remain directly involved — by arresting
strikers, detaining unionists and at time even by directly
intervening in strikes to attempt to force workers back to work
An arsenal of "security" legislation remains on the
statute books, to be used against unionists as well as other
black leaders.
The migrant labour system remains — indeed, it is being
intensified -- and this obviously continues to weaken black
bargaining power as striking workers risk dismissal and
ejection to rural "dumping groups."
The balance of power remains firmly in the hands of
employers and is likely to remain so for some time.
And the possibility always remains that the authorities
will despair of their increasingly unsuccessful attempts
to control through reform and will seek to crush the union
movement through direct repression.
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In addition, as unionists are always careful to point
out, a recession would pose serious problems for unions by
eroding black bargaining power.
A recession, signs of which are already apparent, could
have a particularly devastating effect on mass-based unions
without solid factory floor roots and particularly some newer
unions are likely to suffer sharply through a slump.
But we are concerned here with trends- The severe skills
shortage means that the Government and employer commitment
to increased black skills training will continue.
Indeed, the skills shortage is so severe that many em-
ployers experienced acute shortages during the last recession
and most expect to do so again during the next slump.
Black workers will continue to occupy skilled jobs on
an increasing scale and will, therefore, become increasingly
more difficult to replace. We have already seen how this
strengthened black bargaining power during World War Two.
It is doing so again, only this time irreversibly -
there are simply not enough white hands to go around. And,
of course, if escalating guerilla war makes new claims on
white manpower, this trend will increase even further.
For much the same reasons, black education levels are
increasing — a factor which makes for an increasingly arti-
culate, impatient, black workforce. Asked when they would
make significant inroads on the conservative Ford engine
plant, the young militants in the Cortina plant said: "When
the older workers start retiring and the ones with matrics
like ourselves come in."
The option of crushing strikes by firing workers and
ordering some more from the local labour bureau will come
under increasing stress.
At the same time, the union movement has a foothold in
the new factories for the first time through the recognition
agreements which have been signed. This is a power base
which will be increasingly difficult to break.
Defeats for the unions no doubt lie ahead - perhaps
substantial defeats. But there is no sign that the movement
is to be stopped dead in its tracks.
There are two sources of confusion among those who ana-
lyse the union movement today.
The first is the belief that the country already has a
strong union movement, rather than an emerging one. The
second is that the movement's potential for influence is being
overstated, because there have been bigger union movements
before and the majority of the country's black workers remain
unorganised.
The union movement is still weak, still very much an
emerging movement. But the trends point to it growing in
influence.
This has implications for our views of political change.
There are those who believe that change will occur only
when black conditions deteriorate to a stage in which blacks
can bear it no longer.
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To them, Government reforms and pragmatic employer
reactions are a subtle strategy to buy off blacks and keep
them subservient.
Some go further in arguing that improvements in blacks'
material conditions are a dangerous device to slow the pro-
cess of change. Thus black organisations like Azapo refuse
to negotiate with the white authorities on bread-and-butter
issues.
They reject the strategy of grass-roots organisation
around material demands as an approach which plays into the
hands of the white power structure.
This can best be described as the "big bang" theory —
at some mystical moment, blacks are going to become so
angry that a "big bang" is going to occur, heralding the
great day of "liberation".
At the same time, there are those who see in each
Government or employer move a subtle blueprint for control
which will succeed in warding off change.
The development of labour organisation over the past
two years severely undermines those theories.
This is not to suggest that the reforms which were
introduced in 1979 were a gesture of earnest and selfless
commitment to change. They were a reaction to pressure
and were born out of a desire to control.
Faced with community unrest, the strikes which began
in 1973, the emerging union movement, increased international
pressure for reform and a drastic skilled manpower shortage,
the authorities took a step which, they believed, would en-
able them to control these developments.
The report was a blueprint for control — a sophisticated
one at that. But it didn't work. Indeed, it had the oppo-
site effect. It forced the Government and employers to at
least abstractly acknowledge freedom of association as a
value, thus limiting the options for repression.
And it provided greater leeway for unions — a far
greater boost to their efforts than a thousand acts of
repression.
At the same time, workers with better education and
living standards have not, in the main become a "co-opted"
elite.
Asked how he discovered the striker leaders in Port
Elizabeth's New Brighton township, a foreign journalist
replied that he had simply "looked for the new Cortinas."
Recognition agreement have not sapped worker militancy.
Certainly, they have channelled that militancy, as
recognition agreements are supposed to do. But. it is signi-
ficant that the Kellogg workers on the East Rand are playing
a major role in encouraging other workers to organise —
and they have an agreement and have won some of the largest
increases in the area.
This may have a good deal to do with the fact that
Kellogg is a forward-looking company — but workers do not
see it that way. Rather they see it as an indication of
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the benefits to be achieved by worker organisation.
Where unions have won disputes, these are probably the
first victories the workers concerned have achieved through
collective action.
That appears to have played a major role in breaking
down the despair occasioned by continual powerlessness —
and that, in a country in wiich a major stumbling block
towards change is blacks' perception of their own power-
lessness, is a major political event.
In short, winning victories through organisation —
through the negotiation rejected by some — is likely to
increase black political morale and muscle.
And, while there are those who argue that extensions
in black bargaining rights depend simply on the strength
and degree of organisation of workers, this, too, seems
misleading.
A more open attitude by the Government or employers
is likely to assist the strengthening of worker organisation,
by giving it more leeway to operate.
This is not to suggest that all "reforms" contribute
towards change. The Riekert proposals on influx control,
for example — seeking as they do to tighten the system
denying blacks security in the cities — may do the opposite.
But reforms which permit black organisation -- no
matter how controlled — are likely to do more to increase
pressures for change than to diminish them.
The Government may be comfortable with repression as
a means of control. But it is uncomfortable with the use
of reform as a control measure.
By initiating reform in an area in which blacks have
such obvious potential power the authorities may well, as
white unionists claim, have "saddled a tiger which they
cannot ride."
UNIONS AND POLITICS
The re-emergence of black unionism as a major social force
is clearly a political event in itself.
However, its emergence as the most successful channel of
black mobilisation has obviously raised the question of whether
shop-floor militancy will come in time to take on a direct
political role.
It is fairly evident that one of the reasons for the
failure of reform-through-control is the absence of poli-
tical rights for blacks.
A wide range of observers have pointed out that a
situation in which blacks are "enfranchised" in the factor-
ies but not enfranchised outside it is a recipe for further
conflict.
J *
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They have also predicted that blacks will increasingly
use their labour muscle — and the most substantial avenue
of legal organisaion which they have — to voice political
demands and press for political change.
Evidence for this has been seen in the growth of links
between black community organisations and unions and the
increasingly overt anti-apartheid stance of some unions.
They add that recent strikes over proposed pensions
legislation have provided an example of the way in which
political issues will increasingly intrude into the labour
arena.
Alarmed by proposed legislation "freezing" workers'
pensions until retirement, workers demanded that their employ-
ers allow them to opt out of company pension funds. Where
employers refused, workers struck.
Workers who enjoyed access to political power would
not have had to pursue their demands in the workplace. They
would instead have used their potential political influence
to lobby for change.
Because this option was not open to them, they chose to
voice their protest in the area in which they did have poten-
tial power — the economy.
Employers, alarmed by the threat of unrest, appealed
to the Government to relax the legislation, which it did.
This has given rise to predictions that bargaining will
increasingly be cluttered by "political" issues. How valid
is that assumption?
It is necessary to examine exactly what union "community
links" mean.
Since the Fattis and Monis strike in 1979, black unions
have co-operated with community groups on specific disputes.
But this co-operation has taken place on labour, not community,
issues.
Indeed, the co-operation has served largely to spell
out how unequal bargaining in South Africa still is.
In disputes where employers have fired strikers — a
virtually unheard-of practice in the Western world until
Ronald Reagan reinvented it — the union may find it extreme-
ly difficult to sustain the dispute.
It often has no recourse through the law or official
system, because the fired workers are no longer "employees"
and therefore do not have rights within the company.
While they can rely on the employer's need for skilled
labour to force him to eventually rehire the workers, this
is likely to be a long process. In the 1980 meat strike,
for example, employers appear to have decided that they
would rather retrain labour at vast expense than give in to
union demands.
The mobilisation of community support through boycotts,
publicity campaigns and the like, therefore becomes an
attempt to redress that unequal balance of power — but only
in the factory.
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In the same way, the recent round of sympathy strikes
in the Eastern Cape could be seen as an attempt to put
pressure on a more "enlightened" employer — where it will
presumably have more effect — in order to force a change
of attitude in a more conservative company.
Certainly, this tactic is likely to increase and has
proved effective for the unions -- but it is still centred
on the factory.
At the same time, some observers have been profoundly
excited by the emergence of unions who pass resolutions
demanding the franchise for blacks, the release of black
political leaders and so on.
It is no accident that the unionists who engage in this
sort of activity almost invariably have little shop-floor
organisation to back it up. They appear to be attempting to
adopt the methods of the Forties and Fifties unions in
claiming large membership with little firm organisation to
back it up.
There is little evidence at present of black unions
successfully seeking an overt political role.
This is hardly surprising. Their battle in the fac-
tories has by no means been won and unions with a substan-
tial constituency to worry about are obviously concentrating
their energies on attempting to win that battle.
What is true is that some unions have made it clear that
they refuse to remove from the bargaining table political
issues which affect their members.
Issues like migrant labour, housing , rents, transport
costs and the like are all political and they all impinge
on workers' lives.
It is equally evident that black workers see their parti-
cipation in unions as a political act, with ultimate politi-
cal goals. This is evident across the union spectrum —
whether union leaders are seen as "community-based militants"
or not.
Demands for union recognition and the like are often
articulated by workers as protests at the white decision-
making hierarchy in the factory, which is seen in political
terms.
As unions become increasingly established in the bar-
gaining process and in the factories, these issues will
obviously intrude increasingly on bargaining.
This may well have an important effect on politics if
employers, as some are beginning to do, begin to see certain
political concessions as essential to the defusing of ten-
sions within their factories.
As on the pensions issue, they may increasingly wish
to lobby the authorities for concessions in order to en-
hance industrial stability.
But there is a great deal of difference between this
process and one in which unions themselves seek to mobilise
workers nationally to make general political demands.
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What appears to be happening is that political discont-
ent, fused with the inevitable conflict in management-worker
relations, is being increasingly focussed on the factory
floor. It is likely- to remain on the factory floor for a
long time to come.
Indeed, it is even possible to view the focussing of
political discontent onto factory bargaining as a concession
of black political weakness in the wider society, where the
potential of blacks to effect change through collective ac-
tion is less apparent.
All this may change, of course, if the country really
does evolve towards a free bargaining system — a goal which,
if it is to be achieved at all, is still quite a way down
the road.
At that stage, black unionists and union members may
well seek to use their more entrenched position in industry
to voice broader political demands.
Indeed, it seems inevitable that they would do so — a
situation in which blacks are allowed to exercise some de-
gree of power in the economy but not in the political system
is clearly unstable.
Whether that action would have the same degree of succ-
ess as labour action appears to be having remains to be seen.
Certainly the degree of white power black workers would be
confronted with would be much greater.
We will leave that to the crystal ball-gazers.
What we can say at present is that a profound change
is taking place on our factory floors.
Black organisations are emerging with a real and power-
ful constituency and a real potential to effect change.
Black workers are increasingly becoming involved in collective
action and discovering a new ability to influence the course
of their working lives.
And there is no immediate sign of that development
being checked — indeed, the reverse is happening as employ-
ers opt to deal with worker leaders.
And that, even if does no,t result in immediate calls
for a nonracial political system, can only have a profound,
if indirect, effect on political life.
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-FOOTNOTE: My thanks to Halton Cheadle for some invaluable
insights into the union movement of the Forties and Fifties,
as well as into contemporary developments with which he had
some vague connection.
Also to John Kane-Berman, not only for the phrase
"Total strategy or Total Shambles", which I have lifted
shamelessly, and to Riaan de Villiers for reading parts of
this weighty tome.
